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Menus I. Mroransry oFFERS a comparative study of three genocides 
- 
the Arme-
nian, Jewish (Holocaust), and Rwandan - in which srate power and policies are
used to exterminate a perceived religious/ethnic group. He throws in the Cambod-
ian politicide, several incidents of ethnic cleansing, and situations that avoided
genocide to put forth an explanatory theory ofgenocide that takes into account the
interaction ofvictims, perpetrators, and bystanders. For theoretical clarity, in spite
ofwide and in-depth reading, contrary facts and interpretations are slighted.
In contrast with both rational choice as well as utopian (genocides are com-
mitted by perpetrators in a ritual of perceived self-purification) explanatory
theories, Midlarsky argues that a perceived threat by and the uulnerabilit2 of the
targeted population, combined with a perceived threat to and aulnerahility of the
perpetrators with respect to their control of the state, reinforced by the cynicisrn of
bysranders and exacerbated by the fog of war in which the perpetrators perceive
themselves as losers, are necessary conditions for perpetrators to be able to com-
mit such horrendous humanitarian crimes, Two other explanatory factors are
introduced. The first is the weakness of mutual identification among the victims, a
situation inapplicable to the Rwandan genocide. The second, altruistic punish-
ment by the perpetrators (renouncing one's owrr safety to punish the other), is
offered to answer Michael Marrus's question (repeated at least five times): why do
followers imitate leaders in participating in genocide? I will concentrate on the
Rwandan case to clarify Midlarsky's thesis, though he eliminates weakness of
mutual identification in Rwanda and insists fear took the place of altruistic punish-
ment for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide (p. SZS), excepr when the
extrenrist Hutus fled to the refugee canlps inZaire (p.SZil.
For Midlarsky, there are three types of Realpolitih first, prudent considerations
of self-interest and balance of power characttristic of non-genocidal situations;
second, imprudent Realpolitik, where a disproportionate use of brutal force is
used by genocidal perpeFators; and third, cynical Realpolitik that characterizes
the approach of bystanders who, in the absence of established legal and ethical
norrns, fail to intervene. A necessary condition for adopting a policy of imprudent
Realpolitik is, first, a sense of loss of physical space under the corrtrol of the per-
petrators; second, the adoption of revenge as a rnode of loss conrpensatiorr; third,
the perception of the victims as wealthicr; fourth, the premise that losses are more
important in determining action than gains (act to avoid relative losses even if such
a course of action entails gamblingand risking €ven greater loss);r and fifth, the
critical importance of territoriality to the concept of the state .
In the space rerrlaining, I examine, as one probe into the theoryts validity, the
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cynical Realpolitik of the bystanders rather than Midlarsky's theory of the im-
prudent Realpolitik and sense of loss of the perpetrators. 'In Rwanda, a rynical
Realpolitik was invoked based on the fear that future US military embarrassrnent,
as irr Somalia, could jeopardize the Clinton administration at the polls' (p. Jg2).If
US inaction is attributed to cynical Realpolitik, French action should be as well,
both in its intervention on behalf of the Rwandan governrnent to stem the rebel ad-
vance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in February rgg3 (p. s3o, rluoring
Agnes Callamard in my co-edited book on Rwanda,l and in Operation Turquoi.se
inJune tgg4 that, according to Gdrard Prunier, provided 'political cover for rhe
nrany Hutu perpetrators of the genocide then fleeing to Goma and Zaire as the
RPF advanced' (p. 2j4, my italics).2
Wren we introduced the Somalia syndrome as an explanation of risk-aversion
by the United States in Rwanda in a report on the international involvement in the
Rwandan genocide,3 we had not yet learned that, well before Sornalia, the United
States was determined to limit its financial exposure in Rwarrda, a stand that
undermined international intervention from the beginning. With respect to Calla-
nrard's account of French military intervention, she did indeed claim that French
intervention'prevented the Front from taking Kigali', but this referred to French
action earlier in the civil war. Further, as she argued, the most important and
dramatic consequence of French intervention was not the possible involvenrent of
French soldiers in combat (which she acknowledged was unclear and contro-
versial), but the effect of the French presence on internal security within Rwanda.
Callamard's account stressed French general political detachment llom Rwandan
affairs.
Finally, it is too easy to miss the fact that Prunier was ofl'ering a political explan-
ation for French intervention and not a military consequential account, as the
French desperately tried 'to glorify tbe Turquozic intervention in the hope of
washing offany genocidal bloodspots in the baptismal waters of "humanitarian"
action'(Prunier, p. 296). The above corrections of inaccuracies and interpreta-
tions o{fer far more subtle accounts of bystander inaction and do not remove the
cyrticism behind US and French behaviour, and certainly not their short-sighted
quality. More important, such accounts make it difficult to distinguish between
actions based on self-interest that are prudent arrd other self-interested actions that
are characterized as cynical {br ignoring international ethical and legal norms.
Midlarsky wants to enjoy his realist cake while professing a dietary abstention flom
idealism.
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